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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
08/813,829	03/06/1997	BRIGID L. M. HOGAN	16016.0005	3939
23859 75	90 05/18/2005		EXAMINER	
NEEDLE & ROSENBERG, P.C.			WOITACH, JOSEPH T	
SUITE 1000 999 PEACHTR	EE STREET	-	ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
ATLANTA, GA 30309-3915			1632	-
	•		DATE MAILED: 05/18/200	5

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

	Application No.	Applicant(s)				
	08/813,829	HOGAN, BRIGID L. M.				
Office Action Summary	Examiner	Art Unit				
	Joseph T. Woitach	1632				
The MAILING DATE of this communication app		–				
Period for Reply						
A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION. - Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.13 after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication. - If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply - If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period w - Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).	6(a). In no event, however, may a reply be tim within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days ill apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from cause the application to become ABANDONEI	ely filed will be considered timely. the mailing date of this communication. O (35 U.S.C. § 133).				
Status						
1) Responsive to communication(s) filed on 6/1/20	004.					
	action is non-final.					
3) Since this application is in condition for allowan						
closed in accordance with the practice under E	closed in accordance with the practice under Ex parte Quayle, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.					
Disposition of Claims						
4)⊠ Claim(s) <u>4 and 37-44</u> is/are pending in the application.						
4a) Of the above claim(s) is/are withdrawn from consideration.						
5) Claim(s) is/are allowed.						
6)⊠ Claim(s) 4 and 37-44 is/are rejected.	_					
7) Claim(s) is/are objected to.						
8) Claim(s) are subject to restriction and/or	8) Claim(s) are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.					
Application Papers						
9)☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.						
10)⊠ The drawing(s) filed on <u>06 March 1997</u> is/are: a)⊠ accepted or b)□ objected to by the Examiner.						
Applicant may not request that any objection to the drawing(s) be held in abeyance. See 37 CFR 1.85(a).						
Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction is required if the drawing(s) is objected to. See 37 CFR 1.121(d).						
11) The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner. Note the attached Office Action or form PTO-152.						
Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119						
12) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d) or (f).						
a) ☐ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:						
1. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.						
2. Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No						
3. Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage						
application from the International Bureau	(PCT Rule 17.2(a)).					
* See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.						
Attachment(s)	_					
1) Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)	4) 🔲 Interview Summary Paper No(s)/Mail Da					
 2) Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948) 3) Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08) 		atent Application (PTO-152)				
Paper No(s)/Mail Date	6) Other:	·				

This application filed March 6, 1997, is a continuation of 08/217,921, filed March 25, 1994, now US Patent 5,690,926, which is a continuation in part of 07/958,562, filed October 8, 1992, now US Patent 5,453,357.

Summary of recent prosecution history

A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114 was filed in this application after appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, but prior to a decision on the appeal. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114 and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the appeal has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114 and prosecution in this application has been reopened pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on June 1, 2004 has been entered.

To consider Applicant's request for an interference filed under 37 CFR 1.604 and 1.607 over US Patents 6,200,806 and 5,843,780 and US application 09/982,637, the prosecution of application number 08/813,829 was suspended pending interference proceedings. This application has been removed from suspension, and prosecution will be continued.

Applicants amendment filed June 2004, have been received and entered. Claims 1-3, 5-36 have been canceled. Claims 37-44 have been added. Claims 4, 37-44 are pending and currently under examination.

Information Disclosure Statement

As noted previously, the information disclosure statement filed June 25, 2004 has been received and entered. The submission is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner. A signed copy of the supplemental IDS is included with this action.

Double Patenting

The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the "right to exclude" granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. See *In re Goodman*, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); *In re Longi*, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); *In re Van Ornum*, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); *In re Vogel*, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); and, *In re Thorington*, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969).

A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on a nonstatutory double patenting ground provided the conflicting application or patent is shown to be commonly owned with this application. See 37 CFR 1.130(b).

Effective January 1, 1994, a registered attorney or agent of record may sign a terminal disclaimer. A terminal disclaimer signed by the assignee must fully comply with 37 CFR 3.73(b).

Claims 4, 37-44 are provisionally rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-7, 15, 18-21, 23-28 of copending Application No. 10/327,400. Although the conflicting claims are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because each are drawn to compositions of isolated pluripotential stem cells and methods that result in the isolated stem cells. The instant claims are drawn specifically to human, while the claims of '400 are broader, however in dependent claims of '400 human is specifically recited and clearly an encompassed species.

This is a <u>provisional</u> obviousness-type double patenting rejection because the conflicting claims have not in fact been patented.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 4, 37-44 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as containing subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.

Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 19USPQ2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1991), clearly states that "applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for purposes of the 'written description' inquiry, whatever is now claimed." Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 19USPQ2d at 1117. The specification does not "clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is claimed." Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 19USPQ2d at 1116. In the instant case, while a written description for a mouse embryonic stem cell is provided by the present specification, a human pluripotential stem cell lacks written description. It is noted that the specification teaches and the claims specifically set forth a series of histological markers the claimed human stem cell comprises, however the specification fails to provide evidence that these markers are specific for human and post-filing art clearly teaches that

certain markers are clearly not present on human stem cells. Further, beyond the differences in histological markers the ability to isolate and maintain a human stem cells has been demonstrated to be different from that used in isolating and maintaining mouse stem cells, for example in the ability of the isolated cell to respond to LIF in culture. While the specification appears to provide methodology to isolate stem cells in general, the specification fails to adequately describe the human cell that is isolated by that methodology. The claimed invention as a whole is not adequately described if the claims require essential or critical elements which are not adequately described in the specification and which are not conventional in the art as of Applicants effective filing date. Possession may be shown by actual reduction to practice, clear depiction of the invention in a detailed drawing, or by describing the invention with sufficient relevant identifying characteristics (as it relates to the claimed invention as a whole) such that a person skilled in the art would recognize that the inventor had possession of the claimed invention. Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 48 USPQ2d 1641, 1646 (1998). In the instant case, Applicants have asserted that the methods would result and have subsequently been used in the isolation of a human stem cells, however it is maintained that the specification fails to describe the relevant identifying characteristics of such a human cell and therefore conception is not achieved until reduction to practice has occurred, regardless of the complexity or simplicity of the method used. Adequate written description requires more than a mere statement that it is part of the invention and reference to a potential method of identifying it. See Fiers v. Revel. 25 USPQ2d 1601, 1606 (Fed. Cir. 1993) and Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 18 USPQ2d 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991).

Applicants attention is drawn to the decision of *The Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Company* (CAFC, July 1997) wherein it was stated:

In claims involving chemical materials, generic formulas usually indicate with specificity what the generic claims encompass. One skilled in the art can distinguish such a formula from others and can identify many of the species that the claims encompass. Accordingly, such a formula is normally an adequate written description of the claimed genus. In claims to genetic material, however, a generic statement such as "vertebrate insulin cDNA" or "mammalian cDNA," without more, is not an adequate written description of the genus because it does not distinguish the claimed genus from others, except by function. It does not specifically define any of the genes that fall within its definition. It does not define any structural features commonly possessed by members of the genus that distinguish them from others. One skilled in the art therefore cannot, as one can do with a fully described genus, visualize or recognize the identity of the members of the genus. A definition by function, as we have previously indicated, does not suffice to define the genus because it is only an indication of what the gene does, rather than what it is. See Fiers, 984 F.2d at 1169-71, 25 USPQ2d at 1605-06 (discussing Amgen). It is only a definition of a useful result rather than a definition of what it achieves as a result. Many such genes may achieve that result. The description requirement of the patent statute requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve if one made that invention. See In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 222 USPQ 369, 372-373 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming rejection because the specification does "little more than outlin[e] goals appellants hope the claimed invention achieves and the problems the invention will hopefully ameliorate."). Accordingly, naming a type of material generally known to exist, in the absence of knowledge as to what that material consists of, is not a description of that material.

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One cannot describe what one has not conceived. See Fiddes v. Baird, 30 USPQ2d 1481, 1483. In Fiddes, claims directed to mammalian FGF's were found to be unpatentable due to lack of written description for that broad class. The specification provided only the bovine sequence. In the instant case, the simple recitation of human does not provide adequate description of the cell that would or could be isolated by the methods disclosed in the instant specification. The rejected claims fail to meet the written description requirement under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph.

Applicant is reminded that *Vas-Cath* makes clear that the written description provision of 35 U.S.C. §112 is severable from its enablement provision (see page 1115). In this case the claims are directed specifically to isolated <u>human</u> cells. In review of the teachings of the instant specification and the case history, it has been made of record to indicate that the methods provide for the isolation of mouse embryonic stem cells (see office action mailed 7/2/1999 for example), however the claims are not directed to this embodiment, so a scope of enablement has not been made.

Conclusion

No claim is allowed.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Joseph Woitach whose telephone number is (571) 272-0739.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Ram Shukla, can be reached at (571) 272-0735.

Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application should be directed to the Group analyst Dianiece Jacobs whose telephone number is (571) 272-0532.

Joseph T. Woitach

Joe Wenter